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Looking at a pair of objects is easy when automatic grouping mechanisms bind these
objects together, but visual exploration can also be more flexible. It is possible to mentally
“re-group” two objects that are not only separate but belong to different pairs of objects.
“Re-grouping” is in conflict with automatic grouping, since it entails a separation of each
item from the set it belongs to. This ability appears to be impaired in patients with schizo-
phrenia. Here we check if this impairment is selective, which would suggest a dissociation
between grouping and “re-grouping,” or if it impacts on usual, automatic grouping, which
would call for a better understanding of the interactions between automatic grouping and
“re-grouping.” Sixteen outpatients with schizophrenia and healthy controls had to identify
two identical and contiguous target figures within a display of circles and squares alternat-
ing around a fixation point. Eye-tracking was used to check central fixation. The target pair
could be located in the same or separate hemifields. Identical figures were grouped by a
connector (grouped automatically) or not (to be re-grouped). Attention modulation of auto-
matic grouping was tested by manipulating the proportion of connected and unconnected
targets, thus prompting subjects to focalize on either connected or unconnected pairs.
Both groups were sensitive to automatic grouping in most conditions, but patients were
unusually slowed down for connected targets while focalizing on unconnected pairs. In
addition, this unusual effect occurred only when targets were presented within the same
hemifield. Patients and controls differed on this asymmetry between within- and across-
hemifield presentation, suggesting that patients with schizophrenia do not re-group figures
in the same way as controls do. We discuss possible implications on how “re-grouping”
ties in with ongoing, automatic perception in healthy volunteers.
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INTRODUCTION
We are able to explore and select information in the environment
in a flexible way and usually do not experience any limits or diffi-
culty when doing so. In a cluttered visual scene, we can mentally
select and extract visual information and even relate objects that
have nothing in common. This ability appears to be impaired in
patients with schizophrenia, and may impact on how they adapt
to the visual environment. It has been related to a more general
difficulty at organizing information that is expressed at a clini-
cal level (Silverstein and Keane, 2011). However, the mechanisms
of these impairments are still debated, and especially the relative
contribution of automatic grouping mechanisms vs. high-level,
top-down mechanisms. Our aim is twofold. Understanding how
patients with schizophrenia explore the visual environment should
help us to understand the mechanisms underlying their difficulties
when attempting to adapt to an ever changing environment. More
generally it might contribute to objectify and better define the dif-
ficulties of patients at organizing information. Second, patients’
results lead to questions regarding the mechanisms of the mental
selection of objects in healthy volunteers and how these mecha-
nisms tie in with automatic grouping. This question is not fully
resolved in healthy controls. For this reason we went back and
forth from fundamental knowledge to clinically related issues. We
explored the ability to mentally relate objects in healthy volunteers,
and we use this same paradigm here in patients with schizophre-
nia. The results will be used to discuss first their significance for
patients and second what they reveal about mental selection and
visual organization in healthy volunteers.
There is already considerable knowledge regarding visual pro-
cessing in healthy volunteers. Form processing is known to involve
a number of steps, from the extraction of primitives (local ori-
entation, color, luminance, etc.), to the integration of the form
contour and surface filling-in that sub-tend object recognition
(Boucart et al., 1994; Humphreys, 2003; Grossberg et al., 2007).
The integration of contour information involves Gestalt rules like
grouping by collinearity, proximity, similarity or common fate,
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and the use of segmentation cues in order to correctly separate
object parts, objects from the background, and objects from one
another (Boucart et al., 1994; Kovács, 1996; Beck and Palmer,
2002; Spillmann, 2006). Similar rules apply when considering the
relationship between distinct objects, even though the pathways
sub-tending the coding of relations between objects are distinct
from those sub-tending the coding of the relations within objects
(Humphreys, 1998; Davis, 2001). Grouping between individual
items allows to identify global forms that emerge from the way
local elements are organized (Kimchi, 2000; Kimchi et al., 2005).
Information at the global and local levels are processed by special-
ized neural pathways, and structure the visual environment in a
hierarchical manner (Delis et al., 1986; van Kleeck, 1989; Hübner
and Volberg, 2005). A number of studies suggest that grouping
mechanisms can occur automatically under conditions of inatten-
tion (Driver et al., 2001; Müller et al., 2010). It has been shown
also, however, that attention can interact with grouping (Driver
et al., 2001), and can be directed either toward the local or the
global level (Robertson et al., 1993; Humphreys, 1998).
Here, we question what happens when attention is directed
toward object pairs that are unrelated and do not form a global
shape. We argue this question is not resolved by usual mechanisms
of grouping, and we suspect it might be crucial to understand the
impairments in patients with schizophrenia (van Assche and Gier-
sch, 2011). We explore it by using a paradigm designed by Beck
and Palmer (2002). Beck and Palmer (2002), see also Palmer and
Beck (2007) built visual search tasks with a setting which can
be considered as a simplified version of a visual scene. Squares
and circles represent simple objects and are displayed on a hor-
izontal row. Squares and circles alternate on the row, except for
two shapes sharing the same form and displayed one beside the
other (Figures 1A–C). The task of the subjects is to spot these two
identical and adjacent shapes, which represent the targets, and to
discriminate their form, i.e., to decide whether they are two circles
or two squares. An additional manipulation allows us to evalu-
ate the effect of grouping. The objects on the row are grouped by
pairs on the basis of classical rules like proximity, or the presence of
connectors linking the shapes. As a consequence of this grouping
manipulation, the two identical shapes are either part of the same
pair of related figures (i.e., grouped by proximity or connecters), or
part of different pairs (i.e., unrelated). As can be expected, it is eas-
ier for subjects to find the targets if they are part of a pair of related
shapes (i.e., grouped), than if they are unrelated and part of differ-
ent pairs. This effect reflects the advantage provided by grouping.
Interestingly, this advantage is modulated by contextual informa-
tion, i.e., the percentage of related vs. unrelated targets within an
experimental block. Beck and Palmer (2002) used three experi-
mental blocks, one with 75% unrelated and 25% related targets,
one with equal proportions of unrelated and related targets, and
one with 25% unrelated and 75% related targets. The advantage for
related targets increases when related targets are the majority, and
decreases when they are the minority. This modulation could not
be explained by repetition effects, i.e., facilitated search for a target
pair when it follows a trial with a pair in the same condition (e.g.,
related targets following related targets or unrelated targets follow-
ing unrelated targets). Indeed, Beck and Palmer (2002) observed
probability effects for both repeated and non-repeated trials. The
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the stimuli used to explore visual grouping
and re-grouping. (A–C) stimuli used in the original paradigm of Beck and
Palmer (2002), with a manipulation of grouping by proximity (A,B) and by
connecters (C). Only two shapes shared the same form and were displayed
one beside the other. These two shapes represent the targets. Subjects
had to decide if the two targets are two circles or two squares.
(A) Example of circle targets belonging to the same pair of figures.
(B) Example of square targets belonging to different pairs of figures.
(C) Example of circles targets belonging to different pairs of figures.
performance modulation rather reflects the prioritization of one
type of pairs (related or unrelated) according to the contextual
information provided by the frequency of these pairs within a
given experimental block. On each trial subjects must process
visual information in order to locate the related pairs, and then
can direct their attention to the prioritized pairs. Since the pri-
oritization relies on the estimation of a frequency across different
trials and is not provided by information in a single trial, it can thus
be considered as a top-down effect. This does not mean that sub-
jects provide a conscious effort to prioritize related or unrelated
pairs. When subjects are not informed about the proportion mod-
ulation and cannot report it after the tasks, the effect is nonetheless
identical to the prioritization obtained when subjects are informed
(data obtained in unpublished pilot studies). All in all the modu-
lation is considered top-down because it results from a global and
automatic probability estimation rather than from a local priming
effect.
A top-down modulation of grouping does not imply that
unrelated targets can be prioritized, and as a matter of fact, the
possibility to prioritize unrelated targets is not straightforward.
In the results of Beck and Palmer (2002), the modulation effects
for related and unrelated shapes were usually symmetrical. This
means that each time performance was improved for related pairs,
there was a symmetrical cost for unrelated pairs, and the reverse.
Such results can be interpreted as a modulation of the priori-
tization of connected pairs, and the performance variations for
unrelated shapes might be an automatic consequence of the vary-
ing prioritization of connected pairs. The more subjects would
focus on connected pairs the less they would spend on unrelated
shapes. In other words, the results do not imply that unrelated
shapes are prioritized selectively. As a matter of fact, the advan-
tage for related over unrelated shapes shows that selecting two
unrelated shapes at the same time entails some difficulties (Beck
and Palmer, 2002). The literature on multiple object tracking con-
firms these difficulties, even though it shows it is possible to select
distinct shapes. During multiple object tracking tasks, subjects
select several unrelated objects efficiently enough to track them
when they move in distinct directions among distracters (reviews
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in Pylyshyn, 2001; Cavanagh and Alvarez, 2005; Alvarez, 2011). It
has been proposed that such ability is sub-tended by goal-directed
re-grouping of the separate objects (Yantis, 1992; Alvarez, 2011).
However, this ability is severely impacted when the selected objects
are automatically grouped with distracters (Scholl et al., 2001; Sug-
anuma and Yokosawa, 2006). This suggests that it is very difficult to
select distinct objects when each one is part of a different group.
Even with a simpler visual search paradigm and static objects,
object-centered attention can be expected to induce difficulties
when trying to focus on two shapes that belong to different pairs
of objects. Object-centered attention implies that when attention
is focused on an element of a group, then attention spreads to
the whole group (Duncan, 1984; Egly et al., 1994; Matsukura and
Vecera, 2006). This means that when distracters are grouped with
target information, attention directed toward the target will spread
to distracter information, and attention is not drawn on target
information in a selective way anymore. Despite this, is it really
the case that we cannot attend selectively to two items when they
belong to different sets of objects? In every day life, it can happen
that we pick up detail information in different sets of objects and
compare them or associate them mentally. In fact, it happens each
time information is hierarchical, and we wish to associate mentally
details from different hierarchical objects sets (e.g., flowers from
different houses, leaves from different trees, fruits from different
piles). Yet we are usually able to compare two details from differ-
ent houses, fruit piles, or trees without experiencing any noticeable
difficulty. Our own results (Giersch and Rhein, 2008; van Assche
et al., 2012) confirm we can attend to such details and associate
them selectively.
We will call “re-grouping” the ability to attend selectively to
figures that are not only separate but also part of different sets
of objects. We obtained some evidence of “re-grouping” by deriv-
ing new paradigms from the one elaborated by Beck and Palmer
(2002). We observed in two different studies that healthy volun-
teers are able to focus selectively on unrelated pairs, even when
they belong to different pairs of figures. (Giersch and Rhein, 2008;
van Assche et al., 2012). In van Assche et al. (2012), targets were
circles and squares like in the original paradigm, but they were
arranged in alternation on a circle around a fixation point. Sub-
jects decided whether the two identical shapes located one beside
the other were two circles or two squares, as in the typical exper-
iment. The presence of connecters led to the perception of pairs
of figures (Figure 2), and as in the previous experiments, targets
were either part of the same connected pair, or belonged to two
different pairs. We manipulated the frequency of connected and
unconnected targets in three different experimental blocks. Con-
trary to previous experiments however, subjects were instructed
to look at the central fixation point throughout the experiment,
and this was checked by continuous eye-tracking. In case of an
ocular saccade out of central area, the trial was stopped, and
was presented again at the end of the experimental block. Hence,
subjects could not visually sweep across the stimuli. Because eye
movements were not allowed, subjects could not compare nearby
figures through ocular exploration, and had to relate them men-
tally. This might explain why this procedure helped us to evidence
“re-grouping” of unrelated figures more easily than previous para-
digms. As a matter of fact, the results showed that subjects became
FIGURE 2 | Example of the stimuli used with an arrangement of figures
around a central fixation point. Subjects had to fixate the central point
throughout the trials, and this was checked with continuous eye-tracking
(Cambridge Research System, 50 Hz). Connecters were introduced to link
elements in pairs. Consequently, the target pair could be either connected
across-hemifields (A), connected within the same hemifield (B),
unconnected across-hemifields (C), or unconnected within the same
hemifield (D). There was always a diamond ( ) on the horizontal meridian,
which remained in the same location during a block of trials, either in the
right or the left hemifield. Subjects were informed about the position of the
diamond before the experimental block. The diamond ensured that (1) only
two adjacent figures were identical, and (2) the target pair was located in
equal proportion in the across-hemifield and within-hemifield conditions.
significantly faster (by no less than 123 ms) at finding unconnected
targets when those targets were the majority, as compared to the
block with an equal proportion of connected and unconnected
targets. Despite this large improvement, performance for con-
nected targets remained stable across these two blocks, suggesting
that focalization on unconnected targets cannot be explained by
an inhibition of connected targets and rather involve a selective
“re-grouping” of unconnected targets.
All in all, the results suggest that unrelated stimuli can be iso-
lated and “re-grouped” efficiently, even if they belong to different
objects groups. This mechanism bypasses object-centered atten-
tion and cannot be accounted for by global/local processing. Local
and global information correspond to individual shapes and pairs
of related figures, respectively, but the pairs of unrelated figures
correspond to neither, and may require higher-level cognitive
operations. A late mechanism would be dissociated from usual
mechanisms of visual grouping and would rather involve atten-
tional selection mechanisms. It should be noted that our data does
not allow us to distinguish between a simultaneous selection of two
stimuli and the possibility that each figure is attended to in turn
very fast, i.e., that items are selected sequentially rather than simul-
taneously (Hogendoorn et al., 2010). In the latter case (sequential
selection), subjects would not be conscious of alternating between
items. Hence, this possibility is beyond the scope of this paper,
since both possibilities allow for a selective focalization on the two
figures during a period of time. As such, both possibilities, simulta-
neous selection or fast serial selection, lead to questions regarding
object-based attention, and conflict with usual, automatic group-
ing. We explored this question further by studying to which extent
the outputs of automatic grouping and “re-grouping” differ.
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Even if the mechanisms underlying this ability are clearly differ-
ent to the ones underlying classical grouping, one might wonder
whether they have comparable end-products.
We used the cost of across-hemifield presentation as a tool to
contrast the impact of automatic grouping and “re-grouping.”
We observed that connecters between targets, or physical
arrangement leading to automatic grouping, erased the cost of
across-hemifield presentation (van Assche et al., 2012). The ben-
efit provided by connecters is akin to what had been described in
patients with parietal lesions, who display a difficulty to perceive
stimuli in the contra-lesional hemifield (Driver, 1995; Gilchrist
et al., 1996; Pavlovskaya et al., 1997; Boutsen and Humphreys,
2000; Brooks et al., 2005). The benefit of grouping contrasted with
“re-grouping,” which was without effect on this cost. Even when
attention prioritization led to a large improvement of performance
for unconnected targets, the cost of across-hemifield presentation
remained high. In fact, it was as high as when unconnected targets
were the minority. These results suggest that in addition to taking
different routes, grouping and “re-grouping” also differ in their
output. In other words, outputs for “re-grouping” and automatic
grouping would differ. This would sub-tend our subjective expe-
rience suggesting that automatic grouping provides background
information and that our mental exploration is akin to playing
with such information at the foreground. However, as emphasized
above, we perceive only one unique outer world, implying that
“re-grouping” must be somehow tied in with automatic grouping.
The literature and our own results suggest that understand-
ing the role of “re-grouping” and how it ties in with automatic
grouping might be crucial in patients with schizophrenia. Con-
versely, the results in patients might shed light on this question.
A number of studies has shown that patients with schizophrenia
have a difficulty to organize visual information (review in Silver-
stein and Keane, 2011), and our own initial studies suggested a
selective difficulty to “re-group” unconnected items (Giersch and
Rhein, 2008; van Assche and Giersch, 2011). A selective difficulty at
“re-grouping” would be an argument in favor of a complete disso-
ciation between automatic grouping and “re-grouping.” Recently
however, we used a working memory task, and results suggested
that patients can re-group items when incited to, but then experi-
ence a conflict between usual grouping and “re-grouping,” which
contrasts with results in controls. This suggests that the difficulty
at “re-grouping” also impacts on the ability of the patients to use
automatic grouping processes. If grouping and “re-grouping” are
found to be competing in patients but not in controls, this would
confirm that the usual preservation of automatic grouping is not
as straightforward as believed. It would call for explanations on
how healthy subjects avoid this competition and make “grouping”
and “re-grouping” coexist.
The results to date were obtained in a memory task, however,
and the competition between representations of related and unre-
lated figures might have been specific to this memory task. To
test this possibility, we checked whether similar results could be
obtained in a perception task.
In order to test the possibility of a competition between group-
ing and re-grouping in patients with schizophrenia, we used again
figures arranged in a circle around a central fixation point, as
already described. We chose this arrangement because it had been
particularly efficient in showing the effect of a prioritization of
unrelated figures in healthy subjects (van Assche et al., 2012). If
patients are unable to re-group items, then we should see no effect
of prioritization in patients, i.e., less variation in performance
than in controls when the proportion of related and unrelated
figures is manipulated. These results would then be similar to
those observed in our first study (Giersch and Rhein, 2008). If on
the contrary the task is efficient in inciting patients to re-group
unrelated figures, then we should observe performance variations
across blocks. Most importantly, if patients can maintain the link
between related figures while re-grouping information, then per-
formance for related figures should be preserved. If in contrast
patients can re-group unrelated figures only at the expense of the
link between related figures, as we observed recently (Giersch et al.,
2011) then we should observe a cost for related figures that is sym-
metrical to the gain for unrelated figures. This would indicate a
competition between the access to related and unrelated figures in
patients, and would reinforce our hypothesis that specific mech-
anisms are at work to enable the coexistence of the two types of
groupings.
In addition, we contrasted within- and across-hemifield pre-
sentations, and this was expected to further our understanding of
the mechanisms at work, and especially to what extent automatic
grouping and “re-grouping” are dissociated. Our previous work
has shown that our configuration leads to a large RT cost in case
of unconnected targets displayed across-hemifields. Interhemi-
spheric transfer is believed to be impaired in patients (Schwartz
et al., 1984; Mohr et al., 2008, but see David, 1993), and we
wondered if this explains the difficulties of patients with schizo-
phrenia at “re-grouping.” In that case patients with schizophrenia
should be impaired relative to controls mainly in case of across-
hemifield presentation. On the other hand, if patients can focus
on re-grouped figures, the comparison of the effects of hemifield
presentation in patients and controls was expected to give some
indications on the mechanisms at work in the two groups. The
idea was that early mechanisms of “re-grouping” were expected
to be sensitive to the cost of interhemispheric transfer, whereas
later and lateralized mechanisms (Kosslyn, 1987; van der Ham
et al., 2011; Stevens et al., 2012) would be less sensitive to this cost.
Our previous results confirmed that even though the presentation
across-hemifields globally slowed down healthy subjects when the
targets were unconnected, it was without effect on the prioritiza-
tion induced by the manipulation of the percentage of connected
vs. unconnected figures. If patients with schizophrenia re-group
and prioritize pairs the same way as controls, then their pattern of
responses should be similar. In contrast, a difference in the effect
of across-hemifield presentation might reveal a difference in the
mechanisms at work in the two groups.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixteen outpatients responding to the DSM IV criteria for schiz-
ophrenia took part in this study. The diagnosis was based on a
semi-structured interview (the Mini International Neuropsychi-
atric Interview) and established by a senior psychiatrist of the
University Psychiatry Department. Symptoms were assessed by
means of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS, Kay
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 274 | 4
Giersch et al. Flexible grouping and stable perception
et al., 1987). Patients were matched with 16 healthy subjects on age,
sex, and education level (Table 1). One control subject was dis-
carded from analysis, due to technical problems with the response
recording and thus 15 healthy subjects remained.
Subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity, and
were right-handed according to the Edinburgh inventory (Old-
field, 1971). They had no history of neurological disorder, gen-
eralized anesthesia within the past 3 months, drug abuse or ben-
zodiazepines medication. All participants gave written informed
consent prior the beginning of the study, consistently with the rec-
ommendations of the Declaration of Helsinki. This project was
approved by the local ethics committee.
STIMULI
Each display contained six figures (0.5˚× 0.5˚ of visual angle each).
Circles and squares were positioned along a virtual circle (diame-
ter= 6.8˚) centered on a central fixation point. Circles and squares
were displayed in spatial alternation except for two figures, the tar-
get pair, which were identical, and a single diamond. Unlike the
circles and squares, the diamond was always in the same location
on the horizontal meridian during a block of trials, either in the
right or the left hemifield. Subjects were informed about the posi-
tion of the diamond before the experimental block. This display
configuration, and especially the diamond, ensured that (1) only
two adjacent figures were identical, and (2) the target pair was
located in equal proportion in the across-hemifield and within-
hemifield conditions. There were two possible target locations for
the across-hemifield location, and two possible target locations
for the within-hemifield location, one above and one below the
fixation point.
Three solid connectors linked figures by pairs (Figure 2). The
targets could thus be within the same perceptual group (connected
targets) or between two perceptual groups (unconnected targets).
In each connected and unconnected condition, targets were dis-
played equally often in the same hemifield or across different
hemifields.
PROCEDURE
Subjects were instructed that they had to look for two target shapes
that were identical and displayed one beside the other. Their task
was to identify whether the two targets were two circles or two
squares and to answer by pressing on a right (two circles) or left
(two squares) response key, respectively. The onset of the display
activated the computer clock, which was stopped when the subject
pressed a key. Subjects were shown several examples on paper to
illustrate the different target locations, and to ensure that they did
not ignore unrelated targets. The distinction between related and
unrelated targets was not made explicit, however.
Subjects were further told to continuously gaze at the cen-
tral fixation point throughout the experiment. This ensured that
our targets were effectively displayed in the same or different
hemifields, and thus processed in the same or in different brain
hemispheres, respectively. In addition, central fixation impeded
subjects from visually sweeping across the stimulus, forcing them
to covertly attend to the figures pairs instead (Moore et al., 2003;
Herrington and Assad, 2010). This represents a major differ-
ence relative to previous studies with patients with schizophrenia
(Giersch and Rhein, 2008; van Assche and Giersch, 2011), but is
similar to our previous study in healthy volunteers (van Assche
et al., 2012).
EYE-TRACKER
Eye position was recorded throughout the experiment to check
constant fixation of the central point (ASL monocular infrared
eye-tracker; sampling rate: 50 Hz).
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment was part of a protocol in fMRI; here we focus on
two experimental blocks realized inside the scanner and designed
to bias subjects toward connected or unconnected targets. For the
sake of simplicity we do not present the results of the experimental
blocks used to measure brain activation as a function of the target
type. In each of the two blocks analyzed here, the proportion of the
target types was manipulated. One block biased subjects toward
unconnected targets (75% unconnected+25% connected targets)
whereas the other block biased subjects toward connected targets
(75% connected+25% unconnected targets).
All subjects were first trained extensively outside the scanner
to ensure that they would be able to fixate the central fixation
point throughout the scanner session, and thus that they would
Table 1 | Demographic and clinical data of the participants.
Patients (N =16) mean±SD Controls (N =15) mean±SD Group comparison
Gender (M/F) 12/4 11/4
Age 31.8±6 31.3±6.3 t (29)<1, ns
Years of education 12.5±2.6 12.8±1.9 t (29)<1, ns
Age at onset 23.5±4.8
Disease duration 8.5±5.5
Mean number of hospitalizations 1.7±1.7
Medication (typical/atypical/+antiparkinsonian/no medication) 3/11/1/1
Dose of medication in chlorpromazine equivalent 259±164
PANSS total 76.2±21
PANSS positive sub-scale 17.4±4.9
PANSS negative sub-scale 20.3±6.4
PANSS general sub-scale 38.4±12.2
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search for the targets covertly and not overtly. Our main aim was
to examine the impact of the bias toward unconnected targets, and
all subjects started with the experimental block with a majority of
unconnected targets. The sequence of the two experimental blocks
was repeated twice in the same order. The first and second run were
identical, except that the location of the diamond differed (in the
right vs. left hemifield, the order of the two runs being randomized
across participants). Subjects were not told about the manipula-
tion of the proportion of each target type. We checked the impact
of the instructions in a preliminary experiment in healthy volun-
teers, and showed that performance was identical when subjects
were told or not about the proportion manipulation. We preferred
not to give information about the manipulation in order to avoid
a possible difference in the use of this knowledge between groups.
As emphasized above, it should be noted that subjects are unable to
report the manipulation when asked at the end of the experiment,
suggesting that the prioritization does not require a conscious
effort. After the fMRI setup up, instructions were displayed on the
screen, followed by an eye-tracking calibration. The validity of this
calibration was checked before the beginning of the second run.
Each trial began with the presentation of a central fixation point
for 500 ms. The six figures appeared around this fixation point for
5000 ms, with only two adjacent figures being identical and repre-
senting the targets. Inter-trial duration was 500 ms. There were a
total of 224 trials. Here we will report only the behavioral data.
BEHAVIORAL DATA ANALYSIS
Median RTs were derived from individual performance. ANOVAs
were conducted on RTs and error rates. Trials with error were
removed from RTs analysis.
Within-subject factors were the target type (connected
vs. unconnected), hemifield presentation (across- vs. within-
hemifield) and target type proportion (block with a bias toward
unconnected vs. toward connected targets). The group (patients
vs. controls) was the between-subjects factor. Data were pooled
across the two runs (all interactions between runs – 1st vs. 2nd –
and other factors – target type, hemifield presentation, target type
proportion and groups: Fs< 1; there was no effect of right vs. left
presentation).
RESULTS
There was no main effect of group: patients were only slightly
slower and less accurate than controls [by 155 ms, F(1, 29)= 1.030,
p= 0.318, partial η2= 0.034, and 3.3%, F(1, 29)= 2.364,
p= 0.135, partial η2= 0.075]. There was however a significant
group× target type× target type proportion× hemifield presen-
tation interaction on RTs [F(1, 29)= 4.459, p= 0.043, partial
η2= 0.133], and a target type× target type proportion× group
interaction on percent errors [F(1, 29)= 8.555, p= 0.006, partial
η2= 0.228]. We first detail RTs (illustrated in Figure 3). We then
estimate the cost of across-hemifield presentation and summarize
data on error rates (Figure 4).
Patients and controls differed when targets were in the same
hemifield [target type× target type proportion× group interac-
tion: F(1, 29)= 6.353, p= 0.017, partial η2= 0.179]. The interac-
tion between target type and target type proportion was significant
in patients [F(1, 15)= 17.160, p= 0.0009, partial η2= 0.533] but
FIGURE 3 | Mean RTs in the induction blocks, in patients (upper panel)
and controls (lower panel; vertical bars: error bars). Results are
illustrated according to the experimental blocks (with a bias toward
unconnected vs. connected figures), type of target pair (unconnected vs.
connected), and presentation of target pair (in the same or in different
hemifields).
not in controls [F(1, 14)= 2.518, p= 0.135, partial η2= 0.152].
Patients showed an unusual advantage for unconnected relative
to connected targets in the block with a bias toward unconnected
figures [by 224 ms, F(1, 15)= 5.376, p= 0.035, partial η2= 0.264,
Figure 3 rightward upper panel]. This was not the case in controls,
who were equally fast for connected and unconnected targets in the
block with a bias toward unconnected figures [F(1, 14)= 0.009,
p= 0.926, partial η2= 0.0006]. In contrast in the block with a
bias toward connected targets, the advantage for connected over
unconnected targets was significant in both patients [390 ms, F(1,
15)= 10.621, p= 0.005, partial η2= 0.414] and controls [165 ms,
F(1, 14)= 6.649, p= 0.022, partial η2= 0.322; these effects do not
differ significantly, F(1, 29)= 1.525, p= 0.227, partialη2= 0.050].
To summarize, patients showed a significant advantage for uncon-
nected over connected targets when the former were the majority,
and vice versa. On the other hand, controls performed equally
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FIGURE 4 | Mean percent errors in patients (upper panel) and controls
(lower panel; vertical bars: error bars). Results are illustrated according to
the experimental blocks (with a bias toward unconnected vs. connected
figures), type of target pair (unconnected vs. connected), and presentation
of target pair (in the same or in different hemifields).
for both target types when unconnected targets were the majority,
showing that despite the priority toward unconnected targets, they
were still efficient in occasional trials with connected targets.
When targets were displayed in different hemifields, there
was no interaction with group [target type× target type pro-
portion× group interaction: F(1, 29)= 0.032, p= 0.859, partial
η2= 0.001]. Both patients and controls showed the typical advan-
tage for connected over unconnected targets (controls: 184 ms
[F(1, 14)= 22.168, p= 0.0003, partial η2= 0.613], patients:
190 ms [F(1, 15)= 12.581, p= 0.003, partial η2= 0.456]. This
replicates results obtained with another sample of healthy subjects,
and shows that connectors linking targets across-hemifields allows
to facilitate the comparison of targets that are initially processed
in different brain hemispheres (van Assche et al., 2012).
As a result of the performance differences in case of within- and
across-hemifield presentation in patients, there was a significant
interaction between target type (connected vs. unconnected),
hemifield presentation (across- vs. within-hemifield), and target
type proportion (with a bias toward unconnected vs. toward con-
nected targets) in the patients’ group: F(1, 15)= 11.752, p= 0.004,
partial η2= 0.439. In controls, there was a global effect of hemi-
field presentation [with an advantage of 96 ms for within- vs.
across-hemifield presentation, F(1, 14)= 5.453, p= 0.035, partial
η2= 0.280] but no interaction with other effects: especially, there
was no interaction between target type, target type proportion,
and hemifield presentation [F(1, 14)= 0.119, p= 0.734 partial
η2= 0.008].
It should be noted also that the difficulties displayed by patients
with schizophrenia in case of a within-hemifield presentation
make it difficult to estimate the cost of across-hemifield pre-
sentation. Patients with schizophrenia were rather faster in case
of across-rather than within-hemifield presentation, by 72 ms,
when all results are averaged. This effect was not significant
[F(1, 15)= 1.409, p= 0.254, partial η2= 0.086] but differed
significantly from the opposite effect observed in controls [F(1,
29)= 5.097, p= 0.032, partial η2= 0.149]. To evaluate the cost
of across-hemifield presentation more closely, we additionally
checked the effect of hemifield presentation for the two condi-
tions yielding the fastest responses in patients when the targets
were in the same hemifield. For connected targets in the block
with a bias toward connected pairs, there was no significant effect
in either group, and no interaction between group and hemifield
presentation [F(1, 29)= 0.110, p= 0.732 partial η2= 0.004]. For
unconnected targets, there was a cost of across-hemifield presen-
tation in both groups (209 ms in controls and 133 ms in patients
with schizophrenia) and this cost did not differ across groups [F(1,
29)= 0.489, p= 0.490 partial η2= 0.017]. No effect involving the
hemifield presentation was found significant in the analysis on
error rates.
In the analysis on error rates, we decomposed the already men-
tioned interaction target type× target type proportion× group
[F(1, 29)= 8.555, p= 0.006, partial η2= 0.228]. A significant
interaction between target type and target type proportion was
found in patients [F(1, 15)= 6.212, p= 0.025, partial η2= 0.293].
Further decompositions did not yield significant effects however.
Nor was there any significant effect in controls. The effect could
thus be attributed to opposite trends of grouping across exper-
imental blocks in patients (Figure 4). The graph suggests it is
present mainly when targets are displayed within the same hemi-
field, but this is not supported by statistical analyses. The lack of
randomization across blocks and the lack of significant effects after
decomposition of the results mean these results should be taken
with caution. They do not contradict the results on RTs, however.
DISCUSSION
The results show that patients can re-group two items which
belong to different perceptual groups when incited to do so.
Patients improve performance for unconnected targets when those
are more frequent, unlike in our previous studies (Giersch and
Rhein, 2008; van Assche and Giersch, 2011), suggesting that
they can re-group items under specific task conditions. How-
ever, this is accompanied by a disadvantage for connected tar-
gets in the within-hemifield condition, replicating results with a
memory-related paradigm (Giersch et al., 2011). Being slower for
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connected than unconnected targets is unusual. We observed this
effect once in controls, but only in untrained subjects (van Assche
et al., 2012), which was not the case here. All subjects were trained
extensively before the test, and in healthy subjects, the results
always show a preserved access to connected figures, even when the
task incites subjects to prioritize unconnected figures efficiently.
It is as if controls have access to connected targets whatever the
attention conditions. In contrast, re-grouping unconnected tar-
gets leads patients to temporarily lose the perceptual organization
derived from automatic grouping. Several limitations should be
discussed first, however.
There is one methodological limitation to this work related
to the fact that all subjects started with a block driving them to
prioritize unconnected figures. This was done for imaging reasons
and prevented us from directly comparing performance variations
across blocks. It is to be noted, however, that the opposite effects
for connected and unconnected targets across blocks (in case of
within-hemifield presentation in patients) cannot be explained
by effects of order: for connected targets, performance improves
from one block to the other, whereas the opposite is observed
for unconnected targets. Most importantly, we base our analysis
on performance differences observed within a single experimental
block rather than across experimental blocks: the crucial result is
the advantage for unconnected over connected targets, and this
result was observed within one experimental block. Such an effect
has never been observed in trained subjects, whatever the blocks
order. Nor was it observed in controls in the present experiment.
It can thus be reasonably estimated as being independent of this
methodological limitation, especially as it replicates a similar result
observed with a different paradigm (Giersch et al., 2011).
It might also be questioned if the loss of perceptual organi-
zation observed in patients is specifically related to the need to
re-group unconnected items, or whether it reflects a more general
weakness in grouping by connectors.
The amplitude of the reversed advantage for unconnected tar-
gets in patients shows that the experiment is sensitive enough
to reveal a general weakness in automatic grouping. Weakened
automatic grouping should have reduced the performance advan-
tage provided by the connecters across all experimental blocks.
However, when patients did not prioritize unconnected pairs, they
displayed a preserved benefit for connected over unconnected tar-
gets. In the present results, this advantage was rather larger in
patients than in controls when the prioritization concerned con-
nected pairs. In addition the advantage for connected pairs was
preserved in case of across-hemifield presentation. In sum, weak-
ened grouping by connectors appears to result from prior attention
focus on unconnected pairs rather than a genuine impairment in
automatic grouping, consistent with previous results (Giersch and
Rhein, 2008; Giersch et al., 2011; van Assche and Giersch, 2011).
Contrary to controls, however, patients showed significantly
different effects in case of within- vs. across-hemifield presen-
tation. Such an effect of hemifield presentation has not been
observed in healthy subjects, neither in the present study, nor in
our previous study (van Assche et al., 2012). Even when proba-
bility effects led to clear performance improvements for uncon-
nected figures in healthy subjects (van Assche et al., 2012), this
improvement was similar whatever the position of the targets
(within- or across-hemifields). Importantly this coexisted with
a high cost of across-hemifield presentation for unconnected
figures, showing that the paradigm was sensitive to the cost of
across-hemifield presentation. This pattern of results is in marked
contrast with the results of patients in the present study. These
results suggest that even if patients “re-group” information, they
do not do it in the same way as healthy subjects do. The fact that
patients “re-group” efficiently only in case of within-hemifield,
and not across-hemifield presentation, might be explained by an
involvement of the connectivity between hemispheres. This dif-
ference between patients and controls can hardly be explained by
a difference in the cost of interhemispheric transfer. There was
no evidence of a higher cost of across-hemifield presentation in
patients than in controls, and the main difference between the
two groups occurred in case of intra-hemifield presentation. The
results rather suggest that controls mobilize lateralized mecha-
nisms when prioritizing unconnected figures (Kosslyn, 1987; van
der Ham et al., 2011; Stevens et al., 2012), whereas patients use
mechanisms requiring an exchange of information between hemi-
spheres, i.e., possibly earlier and more automatic mechanisms.
This interpretation requires confirmation. However, whatever the
precise explanations for the effects in patients, they suggest that
the patients do not re-group items in the same way as con-
trols. In other perception studies (Giersch and Rhein, 2008; van
Assche and Giersch, 2011), patients did not show evidence of
“re-grouping,” but the results again suggested difficulties with re-
grouping. All in all these results confirm that re-grouping requires
specific mechanisms and, most importantly, that preserving auto-
matic grouping when re-grouping unconnected figures is not
straightforward.
INTEGRATING GROUPING AND “RE-GROUPING”: OUR PROPOSAL
We argue that the results observed in patients with schizophre-
nia shed light on the difficulties encountered when exploring the
visual environment in a flexible way while maintaining a sensation
of stability of the outer world. The results in patients emphasize
the difficulty arising when relating unconnected items in the envi-
ronment. Our results show that being able to re-group items is not
enough to explore visual information in an optimal way, i.e., with-
out loosing access to automatically grouped figures. First, the way
re-grouping is performed matters. It is important that grouping
and re-grouping are based on distinct mechanisms. Our previ-
ous study had already suggested that the two types of grouping
are not only based on different pathways, but also lead to dif-
ferent outputs (van Assche et al., 2012). This then raises other
questions, however: what is the output of re-grouping, and how
prioritizing re-grouping coexists with easy access to automatically
grouped items. If the outputs of grouping and re-grouping are dis-
tinct and accessed in parallel, there should be some innate priority
given to automatic grouping. This way access to items issued from
automatic grouping would be preserved even when the subject
prioritizes re-grouped items. This might not be enough, however.
Additional ties might be necessary between the two types of group-
ings. Even if “re-grouping” mainly involves high-level cognitive
mechanisms, these mechanisms allow us to play with information
that is continuously processed by our visual system. For example,
when we mentally select two tangerines from different piles and
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thus mentally separate them from their piles, we still see these
tangerines as belonging to their piles. When having compared the
tangerines and made a choice, we need to know from which piles
they are issued to take the chosen tangerines. It might thus be
proposed that the “re-grouping” of items integrates the links these
items have with connected objects. This would mean strong ties
between re-grouped items and automatically grouped ones. The
literature suggests the possibility of a more integrated represen-
tation. As emphasized above, several studies suggest the existence
of specialized areas sub-tending the coding of spatial and concep-
tual relationships between objects (Kosslyn, 1987; van der Ham
et al., 2011; Stevens et al., 2012). In line with this specialization,
a possibility would be the building of a complex representation
integrating the usual links issued from automatic grouping with
the links created when mentally “re-grouping” objects. This would
allow access to both connected and unconnected items.
Such a representation goes beyond the hierarchical representa-
tions involving local and global information. As we have seen, there
are pathways specialized in the processing of local and global infor-
mation and both types of information are first processed through
bottom-up, automatic mechanisms. In fact they can be considered
as part of the automatic grouping processes. This is not the case
for “re-grouping,” however. As already emphasized, “re-grouped”
pairs correspond neither to local elements nor to global informa-
tion. In contrast with local/global processing, the creation of a link
between two shapes that belong to different groups thus primar-
ily originates from attention mechanisms, and creating such links
is costly. It might be considered as an extension of the coding of
independent elements as described by Humphreys (1998). In this
work, it was proposed that“visual elements can be selected together
provided that the elements activate a single, stored object represen-
tation.” In our case, a representation of “re-grouped” items does
not pre-exist to the task. We propose however that subjects build
this representation as a result of the task at hand. Although this
idea clearly requires confirmation, it is supported by several obser-
vations. First, results in patients with schizophrenia suggest that
patients avoid “re-grouping” when possible (Giersch and Rhein,
2008; van Assche and Giersch, 2011), possibly due to the effort it
entails. Second, when patients cannot avoid “re-grouping,” they
probably do it differently from controls, and experience a conflict
between automatic grouping and “re-grouping,” which suggests
that the integration of both types of groupings represents an addi-
tional cost. All in all, this might suggest the existence of specific
mechanisms in order to integrate the link between “re-grouped”
items in the representation of the visual scene. Some kind of rela-
tionship must be established between the two types of pairs in
order to allow for both a selective focalization on one type of pair
and an easy access to both. It is not only the new link between “re-
grouped” items that would be coded, but also how they are related
with other pairs. An item from a given set that is re-grouped with
an other item from another set would be tagged as “re-grouped”
but also as being part of a set of objects. Thus, when prioritizing
“re-grouped” items, one would select a pair of figures tagged as
being part of different groups. This representation is necessarily
complex, since it includes the coding of conflicting links between
objects. It is probably costly to build such a representation, but
once built it enables a flexible exploration of the outer world
while maintaining its stability. This is precisely what seems to be
impaired in patients with schizophrenia.
LIMITS AND PERSPECTIVES
Our proposal regarding how “re-grouping” is tied in with auto-
matic grouping clearly requires confirmation. It remains also to
be understood how a complex representation integrating outputs
of “re-grouping” and automatic grouping fits in with hierarchi-
cal representations issued from local and global information. It
might be possible that links issued from “re-grouping” represent
an additional level of complexity that would be integrated with
hierarchical representations through learning, thus leading to the
building of the complex representations we propose here. This
question is important in order to understand how “re-grouping”
impacts on the exploration of visual scenes. It might be possible to
study this question by checking to which amount the impairments
described here in patients with schizophrenia are at the origin of
their reduced span of exploration when spontaneously looking at
visual objects or scenes (Gaebel et al., 1987; Kojima et al., 1990;
Gordon et al., 1992; Phillips and David, 1997; Loughland et al.,
2002; Obayashi et al., 2003; Minassian et al., 2005; Delerue et al.,
2010; Delerue and Boucart, 2012). As a rule, patients’ span of
exploration is reduced in space and the duration of their fixations
is longer (Gaebel et al., 1987; Kojima et al., 1990; Gordon et al.,
1992; Phillips and David, 1997; Loughland et al., 2002; Obayashi
et al., 2003; Minassian et al., 2005). More often than not, they focus
on non-significant details, and explore one part of a stimulus while
missing important parts of the faces or objects (Obayashi et al.,
2003; Minassian et al., 2005). In order to explore the environment
in a coherent way, one needs to be able to go from one object
to another without losing the visual scene from sight (Bullier,
2001; Fenske et al., 2006; Huang and Grossberg, 2010; Peyrin et al.,
2010). Patients precisely appear to be impaired at relating uncon-
nected items without losing basic links from sight. This might also
account for their own complaints (Chapman, 1966): “Everything
I see is split up. It’s like a photograph that’s torn in bits and put
together again. If somebody moves or speaks, everything I see
disappears quickly and I have to put it together again.”
It will be especially of interest to understand how complex
representations are used to guide visual exploration. It is known
that eye movements are not only automatic responses to retinal
inputs but are regulated by a process of target selection involving
a variety of complex processes, including attention, perception,
memory, and expectation (Henderson and Hollingworth, 2003;
Hopp and Fuchs, 2004; Krauzlis, 2005; Iwamoto and Kaku, 2010;
Pélisson et al., 2010). It remains to be seen to which amount visual
re-grouping is part of these mechanisms and affects endogenously
driven visual exploration.
CONCLUSION
Results in patients with schizophrenia and in healthy volunteers
suggest that it is possible to mentally re-group items from differ-
ent sets of objects. This re-grouping conflicts with usual group-
ing issued from automatic grouping, and requires a cognitive
processing that differs from usual grouping and from local vs.
global processing. The conflict between the two types of group-
ings is evidenced in patients with schizophrenia. Trained healthy
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volunteers, however, appear to process re-grouped objects while
preserving easy access to automatically grouped objects. We pro-
pose that easy access to both types of grouping is enabled by the
building of a complex representation integrating the relationships
between “re-grouped” and grouped objects.
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